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The Scotsman, the Greek, the Mauritian company and the Internet: Where On Earth 
Do Things Happen in Cyberspace?
Lilian Edwards1
“It follows in my opinion, that the person who sets up the website can be 
regarded as potentially committing a delict in any country where the website 
can be seen, in any other words in any country in the world.”
Lord Drummond Young in Bonnier Media Ltd v Greg Lloyd 
Smith and Kestrel Trading Corporation, at para 19.
Internet jurisdiction is currently one of the most vexed issues in the generally 
disputatious domain of cyberspace law. Where should disputes about Internet events 
be heard, when they happen simultaneously both everywhere and nowhere? It is one 
of the greatest strengths of Internet architecture that it is designed to be both 
universally accessible and geographically opaque: so a web page can be published by 
anyone anywhere, will usually give little overt indication of its true geographical 
place of uploading, may be read anywhere, and yet is often perceived as inhabiting a 
mythical virtual domain called “cyberspace”.  As it was famously (and slightly 
surreally) put in one US jurisdiction case, “The Internet has no territorial boundaries. 
Not only is there perhaps “no there there”, the “there” is everywhere there is Internet 
access.2” Disputes about Internet jurisdiction arise regularly in the fields of libel, 
commercial contract, consumer contract, trademarks and copyright and tort/delict, and 
indeed have the potential to occur in almost any Internet transaction, communication 
or event.
Despite the ubiquity of the problem, no jurisdiction has, to this writer’s knowledge, 
yet expressly developed rules of jurisdiction tailored ab initio for the Internet. Instead 
valiant attempts have been made to adapt existing case law, constitutional principles, 
legislation and international treaty law to meet the challenge of the Internet. In the 
United States, where the greatest part of Internet-related cases have been heard , a 
sophisticated but not entirely internally consistent jurisprudence has developed which 
takes into account issues such as minimum contacts with the forum selected by the 
plaintiff, the targeted nature or otherwise of Internet communications, the interactivity 
of the website in question (where applicable) and the general fairness in due process 
terms of bringing the defendant within the courts of the forum3.
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In the European Union, the main jurisdictional instrument which has faced 
interpretative death by Internet has been the Brussels Regulation (“Brussels 2”4), 
which from 1 March 2002  replaced and updated the Brussels Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Recognition  and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters of 1968 (“Brussels 1”). Brussels in both its incarnations has been 
implemented in the UK by the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (“CJJA”) to 
which amendments were recently made5 to reflect the Brussels 2 alterations, which 
mainly pertain to consumer contracts. Although CJJA is a UK-wide statute, it 
implements Brussels differentially for Scotland and England. The basic mandatory 
requirement imposed by EC law is that the Brussels rules must be applied to the 
exclusion of all others in disputes between two EU domiciliaries, but not necessarily 
in disputes between two domestic domiciliaries of one EU state – that being a wholly 
domestic issue – nor in disputes between domestic domiciliaries and non-EU 
domiciliaries – that not being a Single Market matter. The situation is also 
complicated when Brussels is implemented for an EU member state such as the UK 
which contains multiple domestic legal systems. The end result is that Schedule 1 of 
CJJA implements the Brussels rules in any disputes involving a domiciliary of a UK 
legal system and a non-UK EU national; while Schedule 4 applies very slightly 
adapted Brussels rules to any intra-UK disputes eg between a Scottish and an English 
domiciliary. However in terms of wholly domestic and non-EU disputes (eg, between 
a Scot and another Scot, or a Scot and a Nigerian), the English and Scottish positions 
diverge. Scotland chose to apply the Brussels rules uniformly as its domestic rules of 
jurisdiction (with, again, very slight tweaks) in Schedule 8 of CJJA. England however 
chose to retain its longstanding common law rules of jurisdiction for such disputes. 
Hence the Brussels rules are perhaps not as well-known in the English courts as in 
Scottish ones, and have not been relevant in a number of prominent recent trans-
national cases heard in English courts, including most notably the US-defended House 
of Lords libel case of Berezovsky v Forbes6. This relative downplaying of Brussels 
rules in England may have had some interesting effect on authority cited to decide the 
Scottish case under analysis, Bonnier Media Ltd v Greg Lloyd Smith and Kestrel 
Trading Corporation7, as will be discussed below. Bonnier was plead in terms of 
Brussels 1 throughout, a point we will also return to.
Bonnier Media arose out of a trademark and domain name dispute between the 
Scottish newspaper, business a.m. (now defunct) owned by Bonnier Media, and a  
company, Kestrel Trading, run  by Smith. Smith, who had a chequered history of 
cybersquatting-like activities (such as registering Amazon.gr in Greece) and who also 
had an antagonistic past acquaintance with Bonnier (libel proceedings were in fact 
outstanding between the pursuer and defender at the time of the action) acquired the 
domain “businessam.com”, with the averred intention of using it to set up a website 
for an “on line business advisory service” which would aim at a worldwide market. 
Bonnier already owned seven domain names all involving the name “business-am” or 
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variations thereon, but not the vital .com domain name.  The newspaper proprietors 
claimed the defenders had acquired the domain name in order to pass themselves off 
as Bonnier and had breached s 10 of the Trade Marks Act 1994. Accordingly they 
sought interdict against Smith and Kestrel continuing to use, register, maintain or set 
up websites using domain names featuring the “business a.m” name or variations 
thereon. At this point however this relatively simple case of apparent cyber-squatting
became complicated by the issue of jurisdiction, which is the only point this note will 
consider. Bonnier is noteworthy as the first case on Internet jurisdiction to be heard in 
Scotland and, as such, is an important precedent. In the globalised world of Internet 
commerce, the decision also however has an unusual degree of international 
significance.
Two main issues arose:
(i) Could the Scottish courts exercise jurisdiction in respect of a threatened as well as 
an actual wrong which was likely to produce a harmful result in Scotland?  
and
(ii) Could jurisdiction be exercised in Scotland, even where the wrong was the result 
of a website which was physically housed on a server located outside Scotland, and 
which could be accessed anywhere in the world?
The first of these points is an interesting matter of technical interpretation and 
reconciliation of different Schedules of CJJA as drafted to implement Brussels 1 – a 
matter of some, though now mainly historical, UK domestic concern – but the second 
point is an issue of vital significance to e-businesses and publishers all over the world, 
and thus has attracted considerable comment - and concern - worldwide.
(i) the “threatened wrong” question
Smith, it was agreed, although previously resident in Scotland, was now domiciled in 
Greece, which made the case between him and Bonnier, a Scottish domiciliary, a 
matter for Schedule 1 of CJJA. Kestrel, by contrast, was incorporated in Mauritius, a 
non-contracting state, but the pursuers argued it was domiciled in either England or 
Greece, which would have invoked the rules of respectively, Scheds 8, 4 and 1. 
However as we will see, the court did not in the end find the need to determine
Kestrel’s domicile. 
The basic rule of Brussels 1 is that jurisdiction is founded in the domicile of the 
defender (Art 2). However, Art 5(3) of Brussels 2 also provides a “special 
jurisdiction” whereby “in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict” jurisdiction 
may also be founded “in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred”. 
Since the action here related to trademark infringement and passing off, Art 5(3) was 
relevant. Schedule 1, which applied in relation to the Bonnier/Smith part of the 
dispute, as a matter of treaty obligation, transposes the Brussels Regulation wording 
of Art 5(3) essentially word for word. However when it came to Sched 4 and 8, 
Parliament was free to make what rules it pleased and thus, for whatever historical
reason, the wording is slightly different than in Sched 1.  Both Schedules8 refer not 
only to jurisdiction in the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred, but 
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also refer to jurisdiction over a threatened wrong, in which case jurisdiction is 
founded in the courts of the place where the harm was likely to occur. Smith argued 
therefore that, taking into account the contrasts in wording, Sched 1 was deliberately 
not intended to grant jurisdiction in Scotland, the place where the threatened harm 
was likely to occur. Since his on-line business venture had yet to start trading and 
cause any actual harm in Scotland, if this reasoning was accepted, proceedings would 
conceivably have had to be instituted solely in his domicile state of Greece.
Lord Drummond Young however gave this line of attack short shrift. The fact that 
express provision was made for threatened wrongs in Scheds 4 and 8 but not in Sched 
1 was irrelevant as the provisions of an Act of Parliament could not be used to 
interpret provisions dictated by the text of an international treaty (unless they 
expressly were intended to modify those treaty obligations). From the point of view of 
principle, it would be impossible for a state to maintain the rule of law if the courts 
did not have jurisdiction to deal with threatened delicts likely to cause harm in its 
territory as well as actual delicts. Furthermore it would not always be easy to separate 
out cases involving threatened from actual harmful events, as in the case of a 
pollution discharge, where future discharges might be likely to occur at any time. 
Accordingly the correct view was that Sched 1 implicitly referred to threatened as 
well as actual wrongs and so in fact contained identical grounds for jurisdiction on an 
Art 5(3) basis as Scheds 4 and 8. This also lead to the convenient outcome (though the 
court did not quite express it as such) that it was not necessary to fix the domicile of 
Kestrel, since whether the dispute between that company and Bonnier fell under 
Sched 1, 4 or Sched 8, all three schedules would cover threatened wrongs.
This part of the judgment, though interesting, is of essentially historical significance 
as Brussels 2 expressly alters Art 5(3) as transposed into Sched 1 of CJJA to include 
harmful events which have occurred “or may occur”9. And although Brussels 2 is a 
Regulation and thus of direct effect, for clarity this change is implemented in Scotland 
and England by the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Order 200110. The most peculiar 
aspect of the decision in Bonnier is, as Barry Rodger points out11, that given on 
internal evidence the action could not have been raised any earlier than 21 May 2002 
(the date when Bonnier were informed that Kestrel had acquired the businessam.com 
domain name) it would seem that the action should have been raised in terms of 
Brussels 2 – in which the whole of this part of the argument would have become 
otiose. Were all parties concerned really reading from the same wrong page? (And, 
perhaps most practically, how did this affect the costs?)
(ii) the “offshore website publisher” question
The crucial argument made on this point by Smith and Kestrel was that the mere 
putting up (or “uploading”) of material on to a website which was accessible in 
Scotland,  but not physically located in Scotland, was not enough to constitute a 
wrong which would occur in Scotland; and that accordingly jurisdiction should not be 
founded.  Instead they argued that there should be jurisdiction only in the place of 
uploading. The underlying hypothesis here is that since any website can in principle 
be accessed anywhere in the world, it is unfair and puts too great a business risk on 
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traders who utilise the Internet, to expose them to possible suit anywhere in the world
merely on the grounds of that universal accessibility. Such traders might also be open 
to multiple suits in multiple different legal systems, and to forum shopping by 
pursuers/plaintiffs. These problems in their turn might then prove (or at least be seen 
to be) a burden that would inhibit the development of e-commerce, especially among 
the SME community, or might lead to the express selection by such traders of one or 
several markets rather than the entire worldwide market opened up by the Internet. 
This in its turn would suppress competition, limit consumer choice, restrict wealth 
creation and retail expansion, and generally not be in the public interest. These 
problems have been taken seriously all over the world, but have caused particular 
sensitivity in Europe, which has always lagged behind the United States in the (now 
slightly passé) e-commerce gold rush. Accordingly, the argument usually goes, 
something more should be required to found jurisdiction than mere accessibility, such 
as some degree of intentional targeting of the forum, interactivity with the forum, or 
the actual delivery of goods or services to persons located within the forum. But even 
among those who accept this argument, there is less than consensus on the exact 
details of what degree of targeting, interactivity etc should be required, and whether 
these requirements should differ according to the type of action in question (eg 
Internet libel, cybersquatting and consumer contracts, to name but three common 
sources of angst). Thus this question has become one of the fundamental current 
controversies in Internet jurisprudence, which has arisen time and again, in inter alia
the courts of the USA12, Canada13, Australia14, and most significantly for the case at 
hand, England, as well as in Scotland for the first time in Bonnier.
Considerable emphasis was laid in the discussion in Bonnier on dicta drawn from two 
English trademark infringement cases, 800-Flowers Trade Mark15 and Euromarket 
Designs Inc v Peters and Trade and Barrel Ltd (the “Crate & Barrel” case)16, both 
decided by Jacob J at first instance, with the former progressing to the Court of 
Appeal. The odd and mostly un-remarked point17 is that neither of these cases in fact 
deal with jurisdiction per se (even though the Crate & Barrel case is expressly 
referred to as a “jurisdiction” case at para 17, third para of Bonnier). They are in fact 
cases about the substantive law of trademarks, the matter of jurisdiction (presumably) 
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having been non-contentious. In both cases the principle issue was whether a 
trademark had been “used” in the United Kingdom in such a way as to satisfy the 
requirements of the relevant sections of the Trade Marks Act 1994. In 800-Flowers, 
an American company selling flowers from its website, sought to register its name as 
a trade mark in the UK. This critically required that the trade mark be shown to be in 
use in the UK. Would the mere presence of a website in New York which could be 
accessed in the UK suffice? Jacob J held at first instance that it would not, stating:
“The mere fact that websites can be accessed anywhere in the world does not 
mean, for trade mark purposes, that the law should regard them as being used 
everywhere in the world. It all depends on the circumstances, particularly the 
intention of the website owner and what the reader will understand if he
accesses the site. In other fields of law, publication on a website may well 
amount to a universal publication, but I am not concerned with that.18”
This approach was subsequently upheld in the Court of Appeal who also laid 
emphasis on the fact there was no evidence of what they termed, rather reflexively, 
“actual” use of the mark in England: how much, for example, the website had in fact
as opposed to potentiality, been accessed by UK customers.
In Crate & Barrel, an American company who ran a chain of kitchenware stores in 
the USA called “Crate & Barrel” (complete with US based website) raised an action 
for trade mark infringement against an Irish company, also with website,  who ran a 
shop in Dublin also called “Crate & Barrel”. Bizarrely, the action was brought in 
England, where neither company had significant trading profits, on the ground that the 
US company had some years before registered a UK trade mark (apparently with a 
view to expanding their operations in Europe)  which they now argued the Irish 
company were infringing. Again, the crucial question was whether the Irish company 
were “using” the trade mark Crate & Barrel in the UK to sell their goods and services.  
The evidence here was that aside from the web site presence, the Irish company had 
no shops in the UK, did not intend to trade in the UK, and had placed a single 
advertisement, once, in an English newspaper.  Jacob J was again scathing about 
whether this would suffice to found trade mark infringement. “[I]s it rational to say 
that the defendants are using the words “Crate & Barrel” in the UK..? If it is, it must 
follow that the defendants are using the words in every other country of the world.” 
He went on to opine that a website should not be regarded as reaching out a “tentacle 
onto the user’s screen” as plaintiff counsel had suggested. Instead it was more 
appropriate to see a user in the UK accessing a foreign website as “focusing a super-
telescope into the site concerned.” In other words, the mere accessibility of a site in 
the UK is not sufficient for that site to be regarded as making “use” of a trade mark in 
the UK; instead the trade mark is in reality being used abroad, and thus not infringing 
the UK mark. The website is only visible to the UK web-surfer because they have 
taken the initiative of reaching out to access that site. In this view of the Net, websites 
are seen as essentially passive, and web-surfers (or consumers) as the active agents.
In Bonnier, however, Lord Drummond Young took a different approach. He rejected 
Jacob J’s analysis of competing analogies as inappropriate. “Legal analysis of delicts 
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committed by way of the Internet must be based on principle.19” He then went on 
however to have his own stab at capturing the essence of the Internet. It was not “a 
mere static physical entity: nothing more than a group of computers containing 
information which are linked physically together.” Instead it was a “process of 
communication… What is peculiar about the Internet is that the message will not be 
conveyed unless the initiative is taken by the operator of the second, recipient, 
computer.20” In this world view, website servers are not seen as entirely passive 
entities, but as interactive agents; although consumers at the recipient end are still 
seen as the key active agent. He then went on to pronounce the words which have 
bounced provocatively round the world’s news wires and sent shivers down the spines 
of potential dot.com entrepreneurs: “It follows in my opinion, that the person who sets 
up the website can be regarded as potentially committing a delict in any country 
where the website can be seen, in any other words in any country in the world.”
These words were however, to the partial relief of the e-industry, immediately 
qualified. “It does not follow that he actually commits a delict in every country in the 
world”. The de minimis principle would apply to inhibit a court from accepting 
jurisdiction where the impact of a website on the forum was properly to be regarded 
as insignificant. In Crate & Barrel for example, the Irish company’s trade with the 
UK was minimal to non-existent, so it was correct for the English courts not to find an 
infringement of the US company’s trade mark. In the instant case, the situation was 
very different. Smith had worked in Scotland, knew about the newspaper business 
a.m., and had announced the intention to launch an “on line business advisory 
service” which was clearly designed to trade on the goodwill in Scotland of the 
business a.m. name. His acts were intentionally aimed at the pursuer’s business, 
which was centred in Scotland. Accordingly, the case passed the “significance” test 
and the Scottish courts had jurisdiction.
Assessment of Bonnier
With respect, Bonnier appears to be a classic case of a decision which reaches the 
correct conclusion but via the wrong route. Much of this may be ascribed to the citing 
of recent Internet-related English authority based on the Trade Marks Act 1994, rather 
than less recent non-Internet related authority actually dealing with the Brussels 
Convention (or Regulation) and the issue of jurisdiction  - for, crucially, Bonnier is a  
decision on a fundamentally different piece of law than Crate & Barrel and 800-
Flowers. Hence the dicta they contain, thoughtful and well-expressed though they are, 
are fundamentally not “on all fours” with the instant case and may indeed have been 
actively misleading.
Bonnier as a jurisdiction case turns on the interpretation of Art 5(3) of Sched 1 of 
CJJA, which transposes the Brussels Convention rules. This much is abundantly plain 
from the earlier discussion on “threatened wrongs”. Yet when it came to the 
discussion of the second question, how to deal properly with an off-shore website 
publishing material accessible in Scotland, and therefore likely to cause harm in
Scotland, this framework was apparently abandoned. Authority does however exist to 
determine what is meant in Brussels jurisprudence by the “place where the harmful 
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event occurred, or may occur”. It happens to be primarily authority relating to causes 
of action such as libel and negligence, rather than trade mark infringement, but this is 
of no matter, since these are all cases that fall sub the Art 5(3) rubric of “tort, delict or 
quasi-delict”. The key issue here is of how to deal with torts/delicts that begin in one 
country and end up causing harm in another; not how to deal specifically with 
websites, or trade marks. 
The leading case on trans-national torts under Art 5(3) is usually regarded as being 
Shevill v Presse Alliance SA21, a case which went as far as the English House of Lords 
and then was referred to the European Court of Justice – this last step being especially 
significant as the courts have emphasised repeatedly that interpretation of Brussels 
should be harmonised on a European basis rather than allowed to develop in different 
national directions22. Shevill was a libel case brought by an English plaintiff involving 
statements published in a French domiciled (hard copy) newspaper with a small 
circulation in England. In it, the ECJ firmly held that even though the vast bulk of the 
circulation of the offending statement was in France, there was still jurisdiction under 
Art 5(3) in the English courts (which are of course, notoriously kind to libel plaintiffs) 
since that was where the “harmful event”, namely, the damage to the plaintiff’s 
reputation in England, had occurred. Shevill drew on the even earlier and certainly 
pre-Internet case of Mines de Potasse 23, a case of negligence in one country, France,
leading to  pollution washing downstream in the Rhine basin and causing harm to a 
market garden business in another country, namely the Netherlands. In both cases, the 
jurisdictional issue was determined by what was meant by “where the harmful event 
occurred”. Did it occur where the harmful event was originated (or potentially would 
originate, as in Bonnier), namely (respectively) France, where the newspaper was 
published; the polluting mines in France; or the Kestrel web site? Or did it occur 
where the harm impacted on the plaintiff (or would be likely to impact, as in 
Bonnier), namely England, where the plaintiff in Shevill had her reputation; the 
market garden in the Netherlands; or Scotland, where business a.m traded? In both 
Mines de Potasse and Shevill, the ECJ found that either interpretation – the “source”
or the “target”, as I have called it elsewhere24 - was competent. Hence in Shevill, Art 
5(3) allowed for jurisdiction to be taken in both France and England25. By similar 
application, in Bonnier, the “target” of the potential harm – the anticipated trade mark 
infringement and passing off – would obviously have been Scotland.
Thus it was in many ways perfectly simple to solve the problem in Bonnier without 
reference to the Jacob J cases. There is no difference – in principle, as Lord 
Drummond Young emphasised – between the website intended to be operated by 
Kestrel and the newspaper in Shevill. Or is there?
One key point is that the operators of a website have little or no idea of who is 
accessing their site (though software can be obtained to analyse the IP addresses of 
visitors and what domain they come from at little cost) but more importantly, also
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have little way of knowing from what national jurisdiction their visitors are coming. 
Even if a web-visitor apparently comes from a country-coded domain such as (say) 
demon.co.uk, they might conceivably be a French national (say) dialling into 
Demon’s server. And what if the visitor comes from aol.com, or random-site.com? 
There is no cheap and easy way of reliably telling the geographic origin of a visitor 
from a non-geographic top level domain (TLD) (except of course by asking them –
which poses the question of whether personal bar would arise to bar suit in their 
domicile in cases of deception)26. Furthermore as a result of that same geographical 
non-transparency, it is extremely difficult to block all visitors to a site coming from, 
say, France. Contrast the situation with the newspaper in Shevill. Those defendants 
had the option not to sell any copies of their newspaper to England. That would have 
heavily minimised the chances of their being sued for libel in England. Of course that 
would also have reduced their trading opportunities but that would then be a business 
risk/benefit trade-off decision that could be rationally assessed. The risk would be 
avoidable.
Contrast again the situation in Crate & Barrel. If that had indeed been a jurisdiction 
case heard under Brussels rules27, rather than a substantive trade mark case, I would 
have argued that the English court had no choice but to hear the action under Art 5(3). 
The “target” of the potential harm complained of was clearly in England – namely, 
the infringement of the UK trade mark held by the US Crate & Barrel chain. This 
much is obvious, but what is less so is that under Brussels there is no discretion to 
refuse to accept jurisdiction on the grounds that the defendant’s connections with the 
forum are tenuous, (or “insignificant” in Lord Drummond Young’s terminology) or 
that the matter might more practically or more fairly be heard elsewhere. The 
discretion that Jacob J had to play with in determining if the trade mark in question 
was “used” in the UK in terms of the Trade Marks Act 1994 does not exist under the 
far more certainty-oriented Brussels regime. This concept, which we may identify 
with the common law idea of forum non conveniens, is foreign to the Brussels 
legislation28, whose aim is to create a level playing field across the Single Market for 
judgments, and to minimise forum-shopping29.  What Lord Drummond Young 
appears almost instinctively to be doing in Bonnier is seeking, by considering (though
not following) Jacob J’s dicta and instead inventing the concept of “significance”, to 
re-install the concept of forum non conveniens for Internet jurisdiction under Brussels. 
But fortunately or otherwise, the rules of Sched 1 do not allow this. (Forum non 
conveniens has however been preserved for Scheds 4 and 830 however, so that is 
another story for another court.) Lord Drummond Young’s approach is reasoned and 
understandable, but it is not necessarily in line with either the letter or the spirit of 
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Brussels. The fact that it is also not in line with the English approach taken by Jacob J 
in 800-Flowers and Crate & Barrel, is in fact where it may be at its most correct.
Jurisdictional reform for trans-national torts and delicts?
Bonnier is a good though relatively ambivalent example of the problems that arise 
when the ubiquitous accessibility of the Internet runs up against the brick wall of the 
rigid Brussels rules. Few people will have much sympathy for the defenders in 
Bonnier, who were fairly plainly quasi-cyber-squatters, intentionally causing trouble 
for a Scottish based business. It seems fair and reasonable to bring them into court in 
Scotland. But the facts of other cases provide much more problematic scenarios. In 
the English libel case of Berezovsky v Forbes31, for example, an American news 
magazine, Forbes, which was available both in hard copy and on the web, published 
an article allegedly libelling Russian businessmen, who had residences and business 
reputations in England. Although the case did not actually concern the Internet 
presence of Forbes, let us imagine that the magazine was available in England only 
via the Internet (something that was in essence true, as the hard copy circulation in 
England was minimal compared to that in the USA.) Would it be fair to bring the 
defendants into court in England simply because England was indubitably “the place 
where the harmful event occurred” as per Art 5(3), in that a reputation existed in 
England to be damaged? Should the proprietors of an investigative journal such as 
Forbes have to guard against the risk of suit in every jurisdiction in the world or only 
in the ones they actively market themselves towards and make profits out of? Should 
the opportunity of forum-shopping to a “libel magnet”32 jurisdiction like England be 
so readily available, especially as one of the aims of the Brussels Regulation is to 
minimise forum shopping within the EU? Would it be better to contemplate the 
limitation of actions to one jurisdiction which in some way represented the “centre of 
gravity” of the dispute? But what would this say for the rights of real victims of 
unintentional torts/delicts to sue in the place where they suffered the damage?
Are there any ways in which reform of Art 5(3) could be contemplated, to better meet 
these challenges posed not just by the Internet but the general growth of trans-national 
torts in a globalised, instant communications world? Several alternatives exist to the 
current forum-shopping-friendly approach to Art 5(3). First, as we have seen above, 
there is the notion of adding into the mix the plea of forum non conveniens. However 
there are two major problems attached with importing this into the structure of Art 
5(3). The whole notion of forum non conveniens is inimical to the stated intention of 
Brussels to minimise the number of possible jurisdictional venues, and to provide 
certainty to defenders, and it was deliberately excluded from that scheme in the 
reports that preceded the drafting of the 1968 Convention. Secondly, and perhaps 
even more importantly, forum non conveniens is an extremely discretionary concept 
which courts in the Commonwealth world have proved very reluctant to make use of 
in recent trans-national libel cases. Forum non conveniens was plead in both 
Berezovsky v Forbes and the recent leading Australian Internet libel case, Gutnick33, 
and in both cases the courts firmly dismissed it essentially on the grounds that victims 
of libel deserved to have a right to sue in the place where their reputation had suffered 
                                                
31 Supra, n. 5.




harm, even if that place was not an obvious or intentional target of the publication.  It 
is unlikely that civilian judges trained in Brussels rules would be any more likely to 
use forum non conveniens in a tactical or expansive way. It is of course also true that 
forum non conveniens brings in a degree of uncertainty which has to be balanced 
against the advantages in terms of predictability of the existing more rigid Brussels 
rules.
Another approach which has been partially examined in the US jurisprudence is 
adding some notion of “targeting”. In the US, as noted above, the requirements for a 
state to take jurisdiction in inter-state disputes have been mediated through 
constitutional requirements of due process. As a result, with a few early or aberrant 
exceptions34, the US courts have generally refused to extend jurisdiction over a 
defendant simply because they operate a website which is theoretically accessible in 
the forum. Instead they have elaborated a notion of “minimum contacts” and 
“purposeful availment” of the forum, which can take into account in a very 
sophisticated way the actual use of the website made by residents in the forum, the 
degree of interactivity of the website35, and the extent to which there are real-world
contacts with the forum, e.g. actual orders from residents of the forum state36, delivery 
of goods and services, investigative visits or interviews with residents37, advertising in 
the forum, etc. In one of the most recent leading decisions, the “Ka-Zaa” file sharing 
case38, jurisdiction was accepted in California even though Ka-Zaa  had no servers in 
California, was incorporated in Vanuatu, and claimed not to be especially targeting 
Californian business. However it was plain that millions of Californians had 
downloaded software to use KaZaa, and that as a result Ka-Zaa were making money 
out of delivering advertisements paid for by Californian and US businesses. Ka-Zaa, 
in fact, were clearly targeting California residents, and affecting California 
businesses’ profits. The degree of analysis and balancing of certainty and fairness that 
is available to the court in these decisions, far exceeds that available to European 
courts under Brussels rules39.
Targeting has in fact already been adopted in the one part of Brussels which did 
undergo extensive (and controversial) reform in Brussels 2, namely the rules on 
consumer contracts. Brussels 1 had left it unclear if a business with an off-shore 
website could be sued in the forum of the consumer simply because that consumer 
could access that website by virtue of the universal access nature of the Net40. 
Brussels 2 in Art 15 attempts to address this issue by redefining a “consumer 
contract” as one where the seller “directs such activities” towards the forum state 
                                                
34 For example Inset Systems Inc v Instruction Set Inc  937 F.Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
35 See Zippo Dot Com, supra n.11.
36 See Cybersell Inc v Cybersell Inc. 130 F.3d.414 (9th Cir. 1997).
37 See Blumenthal v Drudge , 992 F.Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
38 MGM v Grokster, supra, n.11.
39 It should be noted however that at least one Canadian commentator – Geist, supra n. 11 – is 
dissatisfied with the US law on the grounds that it, too, does not have enough of a “targeting” 
approach. 
40 See for some flavour of the controversy, the European Commission Hearing on electronic 
commerce, jurisdiction and applicable law, 4-5 November 1999.For a very clear analysis of the issue, 
Stone P. “Internet Consumer Contracts and European Private International Law” (2000) 6 Inf Comm 
Tech Law 8.
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where the consumer is domiciled41. This formulation too has created difficulties (or at 
least anticipated ones) for businesses. Reed42 points out that most businesses will 
effectively still target all jurisdictions since it is costly and unwieldy to attempt to 
partition a website into countries which the site is willing to trade with and those it is 
not. A simple disclaimer may not be sufficient to bar the “directed towards” test. The 
problem of analysing the geographical origin of web-visiting consumers arises again
as well. 
In the context of trans-national torts, a targeting test both does, and does not, make a 
great deal of sense. Of course the whole essence of a tort is usually that it is not pre-
meditated, unlike a contractual relationship, and therefore a targeting test can be seen 
as at odds with the whole nature of jurisdiction over such “harmful events”. Yet it is 
illustrative to look at some of the cases we have been discussing. In Crate & Barrel, 
Jacob J’s finding was essentially that the Irish company had no intention of targeting 
the UK market and that therefore it was not “rational” to find the Irish company guilty 
of trade mark infringement in the UK. In Bonnier on the other hand it was plain that 
the defenders did know about business a.m. in Scotland and were intentionally 
targeting their business and goodwill. 
Libel cases, however, commonly present more difficult scenarios43. In Forbes, it 
could be said that it was fairly plain that the magazine was not targeting the UK 
market since there were extremely few sales there and no advertising. On the other 
hand the Russian plaintiffs would (and did) argue that they could hardly have been 
more specifically targeted as the offending story was about them, and they had 
reputations and residences in the forum. Would the issue change fundamentally if the 
Forbes story on the Net had been written in (say) Turkish, a language not spoken by 
many in the forum of England? In terms of Art 15, the European Commission has 
informally indicated that whether a website “directs” its activities towards a forum 
will not necessarily rest or fall on the language used on the website (many websites 
for example, even those exclusively or primarily aimed at the Continent, use English 
as an international and “cool” lingua franca”.) As can be seen, a targeting test is no 
easy way out of the woods. But it does offer a degree of flexibility – perhaps too 
much flexibility – to a forum court deciding whether or not to accept jurisdiction 
which is not currently available under Art 5(3).
A final solution, which may be seen as a variation on a “targeting” test is a “centre of 
gravity” or “real and substantial connection” approach. This idea is perhaps best 
known in the form of the “single publication” rule in American libel law44. In the 
USA, as a result of its history of frequent multi-state litigation, and commitment to 
non-suppression of freedom of speech by lawsuit, a rule exists that a libel is seen as 
                                                
41 This replaced the Brussels 1 formulation which required the conclusion of a contract with a 
consumer to be “preceded by a specific invitation addressed to him or by advertising”. It was uncertain 
if a website met either prong of this test.
42 See discussion in Reed C. Internet Law (Butterworths, 2000) p 196.
43 Interestingly, Lord Drummond Young in Bonnier, while restricting his judgment to trade mark 
infringement cases only, commented that he did not see why the reasoning should not extend to 
defamation and negligence cases as well – para 18.
44 See discussion in Edwards L. “Times for a Change: Loutchansky v Times Newspapers” (2002) E-
L@w Rev 3-2.
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published in one place only (and at one time only45), rather than, as in most common 
law jurisdictions and under Brussels, being seen as published in a multiplicity of 
places – e.g., everywhere the “harmful event” occurs. The advantage of the “single 
publication” rule in the libel domain is that the defendants are protected from multiple 
suits and to some extent from the uncertainty and risks of forum-shopping and being 
sued in unknown legal systems. 
Attempts to introduce the single publication rule via recent trans-national and Internet 
libel cases into England and Australia have been resoundingly repelled46. This does 
not mean however that the EU could not conceivably introduce such an approach into 
the Brussels rules, either for libel alone or for all trans-national/Internet related 
torts/delicts. In the choice of law rather than jurisdiction domain (which is of course, a 
very different kettle of fish) such an approach is already established in respect of
trans-national torts in the UK in the Private International Law (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1995 – which in general refers trans-national torts to the single law 
with which the action has its most “real and substantial connection”. This legislative 
formula was taken, interestingly, from two leading House of Lords cases47 which 
attempted to grapple with the inequities and unwieldiness of the former common law 
“double actionability” rule48. Arguably, therefore, there is some judicial support for a 
“centre of gravity” approach in relation to trans-national torts although so far not 
expressed at the level of jurisdiction rather than choice of law, where it has always 
been seen as desirable to have a single lex causae operating. The current draft 
proposals on Rome II (on choice of law in non-contractual obligations) also float the 
idea of a single law being applicable to defamation actions, namely the law of the 
habitual residence of the victim, and a different single law being applicable to most 
other torts, namely the law of the place where the loss to the victim is sustained49. 
Although this proposal has received a decidedly mixed response, it does at least 
provide a degree of certainty. Another exactly opposite but equally controversial 
option, would be to abolish Art 5(3) for Internet torts/delicts altogether and require 
such actions only to be brought in the domicile (or habitual residence) of the 
defender50. These ideas may seem wild; but they should at least be canvassed to see if 
they might in some circumstances provide both more fairness and more certainty than 
the existing rules.
To be frank, this writer is sceptical as to the chances in the near future of change to 
the Brussels rules to reflect the difficulties highlighted in this article. It was a hard-
fought enough struggle to reach consensus between commercial, consumer and state 
interests when the rules about consumer contracts were under review. Similar 
problems seem recently to have effectively ended any chances of agreement on a 
                                                
45 The question of temporal “single publication” was in fact the main reason for the rule being put 
forward by the defence in Loutchansky, infra. 
46 Berezovsky v Forbes, supra, n. 5; Dow Jones v Gutnick, supra , n. 13; Loutchansky v Times 
Newspapers  [2001] 4 All ER 115. 
47 Boys v Chaplin [1971] AC 356, Red Sea Insurance Co Ltd v Bouyges SA & Ors [1994] 3 All ER 749.
48 Which, to add to the general confusion, has still been retained by the 1995 Act for defamation and 
libel actions.
49 See Lord Chancellor’s Consultation Response on Preliminary Draft Proposal for a Council 
Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations, October 2002, available at 
www.lcd.gov.uk .
50 Some support for founding jurisdiction only in either the habitual residence of the plaintiff or 
defender, as an expedient “bright line”, can be found from Reed; supra, n.40, p 199.
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global Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments, with US industry in 
particular opposed to any potential growth in exposure to global risk of suit.  Yet it is, 
in my opinion, inevitable that cases will arise in the Scottish and English courts in 
future in which, unlike in Bonnier, the equities of the situation and the requirements 
of Art 5(3) will diverge. This has already arguably occurred in the context of English 
common law jurisdiction in the libel field, but the specialities of that area, and the 
apparent determination of the English courts to retain as wide a libel jurisdiction as 
possible have restricted the ambit of debate. Lord Drummond Young’s “significance” 
approach is neither the whole answer, nor, possibly, the right answer. A wider 
discussion on how to determine jurisdiction in cyberspace is essential, and Bonnier
should at least kick-start that debate in Scotland.
